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1 Introduction
Entangled states of quantum systems have played an important role in debates on the
metaphysics of contemporary science. Teller (1986), French (1989), Maudlin (1998) and
Esfeld (2004) all base metaphysical claims on the quantum mechanical description of
entangled two-particle states. Glossing over the substantial differences between these
accounts, their general thrust is that quantum mechanics pushes us away from a meta-
physics of individual things towards a metaphysics of relations, relations which do not
supervene on the intrinsic properties of their relata. Of course, such arguments presup-
pose that what appears as the description of an entangled state in the quantum formal-
ism actually represents a real relation in the world. This presupposition derives support
from the fact that measurements on entangled states exhibit significant correlations, as
demonstrated, for example, in experimental tests of Bell’s inequality. Furthermore, the
flourishing of quantum information theory in the last two decades has resulted in a rather
dramatic shift of attitude towards entanglement: While it was once considered a bizarre
consequence of the quantum formalism with little importance outside of philosophical
debates, entanglement has now come to be recognized as a physical resource which can
be experimentally manipulated in various ways.1
In the present paper, I will investigate whether this manipulability really supports a
realist stance on entanglement relations. More specifically, I will focus on one partic-
ular kind of such manipulations, namely entanglement swapping. In this process, two
pairs (A,B) and (C,D) of entangled particles are created by two independent sources.
If one then performs the right kind of joint measurement on particles B and C, the pair
(A,D) enters into an entangled state even though A and D have never interacted with
each other. Interestingly, this phenomenon has given rise to contradicting ontological
conclusions. On the one hand, Clifton (2002, S163) takes it to support a realistic view of
entanglement: “It appears that there is sufficient substantiality to entanglement that it
can be swapped from one pair of particles to another”. On the other hand, Healey (forth-
coming, sec. 4) studies an entanglement-swapping experiment in which the measurement
1For an extensive review of this development and the current state of play, see Horodecki et al. (2009).
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on B and C is performed after A and D have been detected. Since this seems to imply
that entanglement can be transferred to a pair of particles which no longer exists, Healey
concludes:
The delayed-choice entanglement-swapping experiment reinforces the lesson that quan-
tum states are neither descriptions nor representations of physical reality. In
particular, it undermines the idea that ascribing an entangled state to quan-
tum systems is a way of representing some new, non-classical, physical rela-
tion between them.2
Obviously, the “delayed-choice” clause plays a central role here. I will therefore be-
gin my investigation with a brief reminder of the simple and well-known delayed-choice
double-slit experiment, assessing its impact on realism about the state of the quantum
system (section 2). A more sophisticated (and more radical) version of delayed choice,
the so-called quantum eraser, will be discussed in section 3. The case of the quantum
eraser is important because it introduces the idea of sorting experimental results into
different subensembles, thus raising the question whether these subensembles correspond
to real properties of the system. In section 4, I will apply these considerations to the
entanglement-swapping experiment and show that if the experiment is carried out in a
delayed-choice setting, no actual entanglement swapping occurs. This will, in section 5,
lead to the conclusion that delayed-choice entanglement swapping does not undermine
realism about entanglement relations.
2 Delayed Choice in the Double-Slit Experiment
The double-slit experiment is probably the best known illustration of the basic mystery of
quantum mechanics. If quantum particles (e.g., electrons) are sent through a double slit,
a characteristic interference pattern appears on the screen behind the two slits. However,
this pattern disappears as soon as one tries to detect through which of the two slits each
electron passed. It thus seems that the electrons either behave as waves (passing through
both slits and producing an interference pattern) or as particles (passing only through
one slit and displaying no interference), depending on the kind of experiment we choose
to perform. (In the following, I will refer to the two kinds of experimental arrangements
as “DS” (for “double slit”) and “WW” (for “which way”), respectively.) This is already
puzzling enough, but further puzzlement is added by the insight that the decision to
perform either a DS or a WW experiment can be taken after the electron has passed
through the double slit. It was Wheeler (1978) who introduced this idea of a delayed
choice, and he took it to imply that “the past has no existence except as it is recorded in
the present”, and that “[t]he universe does not ‘exist, out there,’ independent of all acts
of observation” (41).
2 Healey advances this argument in the context of his pragmatist approach to quantum theory, which
I will not discuss here. Neither will I discuss the positions of those who take quantum information
theory to support an epistemic or informational (as opposed to metaphysical) view of the quantum
state. See Timpson (2010) for a critique of these approaches.
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It is not hard to see how delayed-choice experiments can lead to such anti-realistic
conclusions. If we think of the electron as traveling from the source to the double slit and
then to the screen where it is detected, a natural question to ask is whether the electron
behaved as a wave or as a particle at the time it travelled through the double slit. (That
electrons are disposed to behave in either of the two ways is already known from DS
and WW experiments without delayed choice.) Now if the type of experiment (DS or
WW) is fixed in advance, this determines the behavior of the electron, and a unique story
about its wave- or particle-like nature can be told for each type of experimental setup.
However, in the delayed-choice case, the experiment-type is not yet fixed at the time the
electron is at the double slit, so it seems that there is simply no fact of the matter as to
whether the electron passes through both slits (as waves do) or through only one slit (as
particles do).
It is thus clearly impossible to tell a simple realistic story about what happens at the
double slit in a delayed-choice experiment. More sophisticated realistic stories remain, of
course, possible, but they do not come without a cost. In the next section, I will argue
for such a story, based on the formalism of standard quantum mechanics. I will therefore
not have much to say about non-standard quantum theories, such as Bohmian mechanics
or the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) theory. But I conclude the present section with
some brief remarks about these two theories, in order to illustrate to what extent the
delayed-choice double slit complicates the realist’s ontological commitments.
At first sight, it seems that Bohmian mechanics has a straightforward answer to the
question of what happens at the double slit: Being a particle theory, Bohmian mechanics
clearly tells us that each electron goes only through one slit. But it also tells us that the
movement of the particle is determined by the wave function, and this raises the tricky
question of the ontological status of the latter. Some versions of the theory interpret the
wave function as a physical entity which literally guides the particles, or they introduce a
so-called quantum potential which gives rise to non-classical forces acting on them. But
due to some problems of these interpretations, there is now a tendency among Bohmians
to regard the wave function no longer as a physical entity, but merely as a component
of the law according to which the particles move (Dürr et al. 1997). However, in their
detailed analysis of delayed choice experiments from a Bohmian perspective, Hiley and
Callaghan (2006a) manage to avoid a commitment to very bizarre particle trajectories
only by relying explicitly on the physical reality of the wave function and the quantum
potential, so there is reason to doubt that these entities can really be cut off from the
ontology of Bohmian mechanics without a loss.
An alternative way to tell a realistic story about the double slit is given by the GRW
theory, which adds spontaneous collapses of the wave function to the Schrödinger evolu-
tion. But, as argued by Allori et al. (2008; see also Maudlin 2011, 229-238), this theory
is also ambiguous in its ontological commitments. In one version, the wave function de-
scribes a matter density in space. Again, this seems to suggest a straightforward solution
to our problem: The matter density, being a spatially extended field, (almost) always
passes through both slits and collapses to a particle-like object only upon interaction
with the detecting screen. The fact that the experimental setup can be chosen after
the matter wave has passed the double slit then poses no particular problem. However,
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according to this story, the result of a WW experiment must be regarded as outright
illusory: Even though it looks as if the electron went only through one slit (the experi-
ment telling us which one), the fact is that it went through both. An even more severe
illusion takes place according to the second version of the GRW theory, which is merely
committed to the existence of some events in space-time (the flashes), corresponding to
the spontaneous collapses of the wave function. In this picture, contrary to what we
might take as an unquestionable truth about any double-slit experiment, nothing at all
travels from the source to the screen.
3 The Quantum Eraser
In the experiments discussed so far, the DS/WW decision is taken after the electron has
passed through the double slit, but it obviously has to be taken before the electron is
detected. Using a quantum eraser (Scully and Drühl 1982), even this restriction can be
removed. Consider the thought experiment by Scully et al. (1991) depicted in figure 1:
In a double-slit experiment with atoms, we place a micromaser cavity in front of each
slit. The cavities are designed such that excited atoms passing through them inevitably
decay into the ground state by emitting a photon. So for each atom, the corresponding
photon emitted in one of the cavities provides us with WW information. However, this
information can be “erased” by opening the shutters which separate the two cavities
from a thin-film photodetector placed between them. Since this “detector wall” does not
discriminate between photons coming from one or the other cavity, the WW information
is lost and a DS configuration is reestablished. So the experimenter has two options:
He can either leave the shutters in place and detect which of the cavities contains the
photon, thereby obtaining WW information, or he can open the shutters, allowing the
photon to interact with the detector wall without yielding WW information. Note that
he can (in principle) decide between these two options after the atom is detected at the
screen.
But one might ask how this can really be a choice between a DS and a WW scenario,
given that the two scenarios should lead to radically different distributions of atoms on
the screen (displaying interference fringes in one case but not in the other). Surely the
pattern on the screen can not be changed retroactively? Well, in a certain sense, it can.
To see how, a closer look at the quantum mechanical description of the atom-photon-
system is necessary.3 If we denote the photon state by |1〉 or |2〉, depending on whether
the photon is in cavity 1 or 2, and the spatial wave function of an atom coming through
one of the two slits by ψ1(x) and ψ2(x), respectively, the state of the system after the
atom has passed the slits is
|Ψ〉(x) = 1√
2
[|1〉ψ1(x) + |2〉ψ2(x)]. (1)
The probability density ‖Ψ(x)‖2 associated with this state has vanishing interference
terms, because |1〉 and |2〉 are orthogonal to each other. Therefore, the distribution of
3For the following, I adopt the notation of Englert et al. (1999).
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Figure 1: The quantum eraser thought experiment (Scully et al. 1991, 115).
atoms on the screen shows no interference fringes, which is what we expect for a WW
experiment. Now let us see what happens if the shutters are opened to erase the WW
information. As mentioned above, the detector wall does not discriminate between the
|1〉 and the |2〉 state. However, it does (maximally) discriminate between the symmetric
and the antisymmetric superposition states
|+〉 = 1√
2
[|1〉+ |2〉] and |−〉 = 1√
2
[|1〉 − |2〉].
As a consequence, the detector records only photons in the |+〉 state and ignores photons
in the |−〉 state. Introducing the corresponding symmetric and antisymmetric states of
the atom
ψ±(x) =
1√
2
[ψ1(x)± ψ2(x)],
we can rewrite (1) as
|Ψ〉(x) = 1√
2
[|+〉ψ+(x) + |−〉ψ−(x)]. (2)
Since this is just another way of expressing the same state |Ψ〉(x), the probability distri-
bution ‖Ψ(x)‖2 is still the one corresponding to the WW setup. But if we restrict our
attention to those atoms for which the photodetector records a photon, the contribution
from |−〉ψ−(x) vanishes and the probability distribution becomes
P+(x) = |ψ+(x)|2 = 1
2
|ψ1(x) + ψ2(x)|2,
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which simply corresponds to the result of a DS experiment, displaying the usual inter-
ference fringes. Conversely, selecting atoms for which the detector does not record a
photon yields P−(x) = |ψ−(x)|2, which corresponds to the complementary “anti-fringe”
interference pattern (see figure 1b). So each atom can be assigned to one of the four
subensembles “1”, “2”, “+” and “−” in the following way: By measuring the photons in
the WW configuration (shutters closed) we classify the atoms into the subensembles 1
and 2, by measuring the photons in the DS configuration (shutters open), we carry out
a +/− classification.
To assess the metaphysical significance of delayed choice in this context, we now need
to ask to what physical property (if any) the sorting into subensembles corresponds.
Focussing for the moment on subensembles 1 and 2, the answer seems obvious: All
atoms in subensemble 1 went through the first slit, the atoms in subensemble 2 through
the second one. Englert et al. (1999, 328) endorse this view, but they add an antirealistic
twist: “The ‘. . .went through . . . ’ is not a statement about the atom’s past”. This
reinterpretation of everyday language is motivated by their “minimalistic interpretation”
of the quantum state, which I will not further discuss (see footnote 2 above). In a closely
related proposal, Mohrhoff (1999) invokes a kind of retrocausation, according to which
the present determines the past of the atoms. (Notice the similarity to Wheeler’s above-
mentioned view that the past’s existence depends on its being recorded in the present.)
This commitment to retrocausation renders Mohrhoff’s “reality-of-phenomena point of
view” rather unattractive, but one might be willing to accept this consequence. What
one should not accept is Mohrhoff’s claim that “retrocausation is a necessary feature of
any realistic interpretation of the quantum formalism” (332). He reaches this conclusion
by (allegedly) showing that the alternative “reality-of-states point of view" is not viable.
Here is his argument:
Adherents to the reality-of-states view thus find themselves faced with a
dilemma. If they . . . deny the possibility of retrocausation, they must insist
that it is only as if the atom had traveled through the first cavity or only
as if it had been retroactively furnished with a definite phase relation. They
cannot say that the atom really was in the state ψ1 (or ψ2, or ψ+, or ψ−,
as the case may be). And so they find themselves compelled to foreswear
realism and embrace operationalism. And if they stick to realism, they will
have to drop the as if ’s and accept the reality of retrocausation.
But the first thing a reality-of-states view should take seriously is the fact that |Ψ〉 in (1)
and (2) is an entangled state of the atom-photon system, so it is clear from the start that
none of the four (pure) ψ-states can be ascribed to the atom alone, as long as the system
is in state |Ψ〉. It is true that this commits the realist to Mohrhoff’s as-if -statements
(compare my remarks on the matter-density version of GRW in section 2), but to say that
reality differs from what measurements seem to reveal is very different from saying (as the
operationalist would) that there is no reality beyond measurements. The second thing a
reality-of-states view should take seriously is state reduction. After a measurement on one
of the two particles, standard quantum mechanics4 no longer describes the atom-photon
4As is well known, there is no satisfying characterization of “measurement” within standard quantum
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system by |Ψ〉, but by a separable state. A realistic view of the quantum state suggests
that this change of description corresponds to a real physical change. This implies that
the metaphysical significance of the sorting of atoms into subensembles depends on the
temporal ordering of the measurements.5 If the photon is measured prior to the atom’s
arrival at the screen, the subensembles correspond to real properties, because the photon
measurement brings about the state reduction
|Ψ〉(x)→ |i〉ψi(x), i ∈ {1, 2,+,−}, (3)
so that each atom actually is in one of the ψi states prior to its hitting the screen. But
if the time order of the two measurements is reversed, the atom never is in any one of
these states, because (3) does not occur. Instead, the atom’s arrival at the screen (at a
location x0) results in a state reduction of the form
|Ψ〉(x)→ [α|1〉+ β|2〉]φx0(x), (4)
where φx0(x) is a spatial wave function well localized at x0.6 In this case, assigning
the atom to a subensemble depending on the result of the photon measurement implies
nothing about the physical state of the atom, whether past or present.7
But then, isn’t the appearance of definite (WW or DS) patterns within the subensem-
bles somewhat miraculous? I do not think so. Given that the atom and the photon
formed an entangled system up to the moment of the atom’s detection, it is not so sur-
prising that we can obtain interesting patterns by correlating the location of the atom’s
detection with the result of a posterior photon measurement. But this correlating is
something the experimenter needs to do; the correlation is no longer “there”, once the
transition (4) has occurred.
4 Delayed-Choice Entanglement Swapping
We can now apply the foregoing considerations to the process of entanglement swapping,
first proposed by Yurke and Stoler (1992). In the simplest case, this involves entangled
mechanics (Bell 1990). The reality-of-states view presented here is compatible with different solutions
to this problem, e.g., the GRW theory or an Everett-type approach. In the latter case, state reduction
is to be understood as a splitting of worlds due to environment-induced decoherence.
5This becomes problematic in relativistic settings, testifying to the unsolved problem of reconciling
quantum non-locality with relativity (Maudlin 2011). I am here only interested in the non-relativistic
case.
6For details about the coefficients α and β, see Englert et al. (1999, eq. 8). Of course, we could equally
well express the photon state in the |+〉, |−〉 basis.
7Although I have derived this result within a view that takes state reductions as real events, it is
interesting to note that the result is not peculiar to such a view. Hiley and Callaghan (2006b)
analyze the situation from a Bohmian perspective, which does not regard state reductions as real,
but instead assigns a definite trajectory to each atom. Their conclusion is analogous to mine, namely
that the retrospective sorting into subensembles does not correspond to differences in the trajectories
of the atoms.
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pairs of two-state systems, which can be conveniently described by introducing the four
so-called Bell states:
|ψ±〉 = 1√
2
[|0〉|1〉 ± |1〉|0〉], |φ±〉 = 1√
2
[|0〉|0〉 ± |1〉|1〉].
Now consider two independent sources, each one emitting a particle pair in the state
|ψ−〉. Denoting the two pairs by (A,B) and (C,D) respectively, the state of the complete
system is given by
|Ψ〉 = |ψ−〉AB|ψ−〉CD. (5)
This is obviously a separable state, reflecting the fact that the two pairs are mutually
independent. But now suppose that particles B and C are sent to the same location,
where a Bell measurement is performed on them, such that their joint state is projected
onto one of the four Bell states |ψ±〉BC , |φ±〉BC .8 To see how this affects particles A and
D, we rewrite equation (5) by expressing |Ψ〉 in the basis given by the Bell states of the
pairs (A,D) and (B,C):
|Ψ〉 = 1
2
[|ψ+〉AD|ψ+〉BC − |ψ−〉AD|ψ−〉BC − |φ+〉AD|φ+〉BC + |φ−〉AD|φ−〉BC] . (6)
Since the Bell states are orthogonal to each other, the Bell measurement on the (B,C)
pair projects the state |Ψ〉 onto an entangled state of the (A,D) pair, for example:
〈ψ+|BC |Ψ〉 = 1
2
|ψ+〉AD,
and analogously for the other Bell states. Thus particles A and D emerge as an entangled
pair, although they never interacted with each other.
As Peres (2000) points out, this procedure can be carried out in a delayed-choice mode,
such that the decision to perform a Bell measurement on the (B,C) pair may take place
after any measurements on the (A,D) pair. But since particles A and D only become
entangled with each other if the (B,C) measurement is actually performed, it seems that
“entanglement is produced a posteriori, after the entangled particles have been measured
and may no longer exist” (Peres 2000, 139). We have seen in the introduction that Healey
takes this to undermine the idea that entanglement is a physical relation. To support his
view, he offers the following reductio ad absurdum:
To hold onto that idea in the context of this experiment would require one
to maintain not only that which entanglement relation obtains between a pair
of photons at some time, but also whether any such relation then obtains be-
tween them, depends on what happens to other independent systems later,
after the pair has been absorbed into the environment. (Healey forthcoming,
24)
8This is an idealized description. In practice, a Bell measurement is unable to identify all of the four
Bell states. For technical reasons, experiments usually focus on the singlet state |ψ−〉 (Pan et al.
1998; Jennewein et al. 2002).
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There is a clear parallel between this argument and the discussion in section 3, and this
might seem to force me into accepting Healey’s conclusion. In section 3, my unwillingness
to accept retrocausation led me to reject the claim that the atom really went through
either one of the slits (even if a WW measurement seems to tell us so). Should it then
not also lead me to reject the claim that the (A,D) pair really either was or was not in
an entangled state prior to the (B,C) measurement? But such an indefiniteness seems
incompatible with the view that entanglement relations are real. This result would be
particularly troubling in view of the fact that the notion of an entangled state played a
crucial role in the account I defended in section 3.
Yet, a closer look reveals that the parallels between the two cases do not threaten
realism about entanglement. Rather, they can be exploited to refute Healey’s argument.
In section 3, I showed that a delayed measurement of the photon results in a sorting of
atoms into subensembles which do not correspond to any physical properties of the atoms.
Precisely the same thing can happen in entanglement swapping: The Bell measurement
on the (B,C) pair allows us to sort the (A,D) pairs into four subensembles corresponding
to the four Bell states. Without delayed choice, this has physical significance, because
each (A,D) pair actually is in such a state after the (B,C) measurement. But if the
(A,D) measurements precede the (B,C) measurement, the (A,D) pair never is in any
of these states. This is entirely compatible with the fact that evaluating the (A,D)
measurements within a certain subensemble shows Bell-type correlations, just as the
subensembles in section 3 showed interference or WW patterns.
Therefore, far from being committed to any indeterminism about entanglement (or
any backward-in-time influences), a realistic view of the quantum state yields a perfectly
clear assessment of what happens in entanglement swapping: If the (B,C) measurement
occurs at a time the complete system is still in state |Ψ〉, it confers entanglement on the
(A,D) pair, if it occurs at a later time, it does not.
5 Conclusion
I have argued that delayed-choice experiments do not undermine a realistic view of the
quantum state. In the case of the double slit, we saw that they merely undermine a
simplistic realism which unreflectively identifies the result of a WW experiment with a
statement about which slit the particle went through. The quantum eraser and the case
of delayed-choice entanglement swapping required a more careful treatment, because one
needs to get clear about the metaphysical significance of the subensembles appearing in
these experiments. Once this is achieved, a straightforward reality-of-states story can be
told for these seemingly troubling cases.
This does, of course, not exclude non-realism about the quantum state. But it seems
to me that the empirical success of quantum mechanics gives us at least some prima facie
reason to view quantum states as describing an independent reality. The non-realist then
needs an argument for the claim that this is a mistake. Wheeler, Scully et al., Mohrhoff
and Healey all think that delayed-choice experiments furnish such an argument. This I
have shown not to be the case.
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The same dialectic applies, more specifically, to the metaphysics of entanglement. The
various things physicists can do with entanglement support the intuition that there must
be some reality to it. Against this, Healey argues that delayed-choice entanglement swap-
ping implies an indeterminism about entanglement which is incompatible with realism.
Having shown that the realist can avoid such an indeterminism, I do not see any reason
to give up the realist intuition about entanglement.
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